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THE DIFFUSION  OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE ELECTRIC UTILITY  INDUSTRY 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper investigates the  effect of firm size  and 
ownership structure on technology adoption decisions, 
using data on  the  electric  utility industry.  We  argue 
that  traditional models of  technology  diffusion are sub- 
ject  to  sample selectivity  biases that  may overstate the 
effect of  firm  size  on adoption probabilities.  By  exten- 
ding  conventional hazard rate  models to use information 
on both adoption and non-adoption decisions, we differen- 
tiate  between firms'  opportunities for adoption and their 
underlying adoption propensities.  The results suggest 
that large  firms  and investor-owned  electric utilities 
are likely to  adopt  new technologies  earlier than their 
smaller and publicly-owned counterparts.  Moreover,  the 
selection biases from  conventional  statistical models can 
lead one to  overstate size  effects by  a  factor of  two  and 
to  understate ownership structure and factor cost  effects 
by  two  to  four times. 
Nancy L.  Rose  Paul L. Joskow 
School of Management  Department of Economics 
MIT  MIT 
Cambridge, MA  02139  Cambridge, MA  02139 1.  Introduction 
Economists have long been interested in  under- 
standing the determinants of technology diffusion across 
firms  and industries.1  An important set of questions in 
this  area concerns "Schumpeterian"  hypotheses of the 
influence of competition and firm size  on innovation. 
Much of the theoretical and empirical work on process 
technology diffusion suggests  that firm size may play an 
important  role in decisions to  adopt new technologies, 
perhaps as  a  proxy for such factors  such as  risk aver- 
sion,  participation in research  and development activi- 
ties,  or economies of  scale  in using the innovation. 
Recent empirical studies  yield mixed results,  however,  on 
the question of whether larger firms  are more or  less 
innovative than are  their  smaller counterparts (see 
Oster,  1982,  Hannan and McDowell, 1984,  and Levin,  Levin, 
and Meisel (hereafter  LLM)  ,  1987). 
This  paper uses  data  on steam-electric  generating 
technology to  analyze  patterns of process technology 
diffusion across firms.  By restricting the  study  to the 
electric utility industry,  we abstract from competitive 
and market structure  effects:  virtually all firms 
operate as  local  monopolies subject either to  rate  of 
return regulation in  the case  of  investor-owned  utilities 
(lOUs)  or  to  other forms  of control in the case  of most 
1  See for  example,  Griliches (1957),  Mansfield 
(1968),  David (1969),  and Nasbeth and Ray (1974). 2 
government and cooperatively-owned  utilities.2  This 
allows us  to  focus  the analysis  on  the  role  of  firm size 
and two other  determinants of technology diffusion sug- 
gested by the  theoretical  and empirical literature: 
factor cost  differences that  influence the expected cost 
savings from adopting an innovation  and firms'  ownership 
structures.  The nature of  our data also  makes  it 
possible for us  to  distinguish  between measured size 
effects resulting only from differences in opportunities 
to  adopt  and those  resulting from  an underlying propen- 
sity to  adopt new technologies  quickly. 
Two steam-electric generating technologies are 
analyzed in  the paper:  high pressure conventional  units 
(2400 pounds per square inch (psi))  and very high 
pressure supercritical units  (above  3206  psi).3  The 2400 
psi technology  was first  introduced  in  1953  and began to 
2  The existence of  de  facto  exclusive retail 
franchises and rate-of-return  regulation need not imply 
that firms  have  no  incentives  to undertake cost-reducing 
investments.  For investor-owned  utilities (bus), 
regulatory lag provides strong incentives to invest in 
cost saving technologies (Joskow,  1974).  Other mecha- 
nisms through  which investment  incentives may operate 
include the threat of municipal condemnation (takeovers) 
and the possibility of wholesale power  transactions  with 
other utilities.  All three  of  these  mechanisms operated 
during our sample period and were particularly  prominent 
during the l95Os and l960s,  when most of the generating 
units in our sample were planned. 
These technologies are discussed in Joskow and 
Rose (1985).  We  do not consider nuclear power techno- 
logies;  see Sommers (1980)  for a study of nuclear power 
technology choice. 3 
diffuse fairly widely by 1958;  the supercritical technol- 
ogy was  first introduced in  1957 but diffused much more 
slowly.  We use data on 144 utilities that  built steam 
generating units  between 1950  and 1980  to  estimate the 
determinants of  firms'  decisions to  adopt  each of  these 
technologies.  Results from  a broad range  of  statistical 
specifications suggest that  larger firms  and investor- 
owned utilities tend  to  adopt new technologies earlier 
than  do  small  firms and municipal or cooperative 
utilities, conditional on equal  factor  prices.  Our 
finding of positive correlations  between firm size  and 
the speed of technology adoption is  similar to  the 
conclusions reached  by Sommers (1980)  with respect to 
nuclear power,  by Hannan and McDowell (1984)  with respect 
to  the banking industry,  and by many of  the  case  studies 
in Mansfield (1968)  and Nasbeth and Ray (l974).  This 
result stands in contrast to  Oster's (1982)  conclusion 
that  large  firms  were slower to  adopt  innovations in  the 
steel  industry and to  LLM's  (1987) conclusion that firm 
size  does  not affect technology  adoption by grocery 
stores. 
We  also  find  that  controlling  for differential 
opportunities to  adopt is  critical to  the  results.  Large 
These  studies  do  not,  however,  control for 
differential  adoption opportunities.  As  discussed at 
greater length below, this  may bias their results toward 
estimating  positive relationships  even when no  relation- 
ship  exists. 4 
firms  have a  higher probability of building a  new genera- 
ting unit of any kind in  a  given year,  other things 
equal.  Failing to  account  for these  higher building 
probabilities leads  one  to  overstate size effects on 
adoption propensities by a  factor of  two  and to  under- 
state the  effects of ownership structure and potential 
cost savings on adoption propensities for the 2400 psi 
technology. 
The paper is  structured  as  follows:  In the next 
section we briefly discuss theoretical  and empirical 
models of interfirm technology  diffusion.  Section 3 
describes the particular innovations  we study and the 
factors likely to  affect their  diffusion.  Statistical 
models of adoption decisions are developed and compared 
in section 4  and estimates from these  are reported in 
section 5.  Conclusions  are  contained in  the final 
section. 
2.  The  Diffusion of New Technoloies 
Theoretical models of technology diffusion have 
attracted increasing attention in recent years; see 
Stoneman (1986)  and David (1986)  for overviews.  Although 
the  specific predictions depend upon the  assumptions and 
focus  of each model,  a  common Set of factors that should 
influence the diffusion process tends  to  emerge.  These 
include expected cost  savings from adopting the innovation,  competitive conditions  and technological 
characteristics that  affect the appropriability of  gains, 
and characteristics that  influence the expected profit- 
ability of  the  innovation or  firms'  "willingness to 
innovate," such as  economies of  scale  or  of learning in 
using the  innovation, firm participation in complementary 
R&D activity, and discount rates.  A diffusion path 
typically is  generated  by assuming that  the cost of 
adopting the  innovation declines  through time.  Firms' 
relative positions along this  path are determined by 
their  characteristics:  firms with lower  discount rates 
will adopt before firms with higher discount rates, 
larger firms  will adopt sooner than smaller firms  if 
economies of  scale  are  important,  firms with high factor 
costs  will adopt  innovations that  increase input effi- 
ciency earlier than will firms with low factor costs. 
Early  theoretical  work assumed  that the  costs  and 
benefits of  the  innovation  were known.  More recent 
papers have relaxed these  assumptions  and emphasized the 
effects of uncertainty.  In  these models diffusion paths 
can be generated as  uncertainty about  the technology is 
resolved over time.  Adoption decisions are influenced by 
firms'  prior estimates of  the mean and variance of  the 
innovation's returns,  their  information  updating proces- 
ses and risk aversion, and the expected path of future 
technological change.  These models suggest that more 6 
risk averse firms  will be  slower to  adopt innovations, 
that  firms  may make mistakes  (adopt  technologies  that are 
ex post unprofitable and fail  to  adopt  those that  are ex 
post profitable), and that  interfirm diffusion will be 
slower  when innovations are perceived to be riskier. 
Institutional characteristics  also may play an 
important role  in determining the path of diffusion.  Of 
these,  the theoretical literature  has been most concerned 
with possible vintage or "history"  effects induced by the 
embodiment of technology in  long-lived physical capital. 
As David (1986)  notes,  new technologies will be  rela- 
tively disadvantaged  when they  are  embodied in indivisi- 
ble capitat goods,  particularly if capital costs  of new 
plant are high relative to  the operating cost of existing 
facilities.  Not only  will  this  tend to  slow the 
diffusion of  the new technology  throughout the industry, 
it also suggests that the pattern of technology diffusion 
across firms  will be dependent  upon the history of 
capital investment.  Firms  that  are equally likely to 
adopt a  new technology,  other  things equal,  may do  so  at 
different times  if  their  initial  capital configurations 
differ.  It  seems  misleading,  however,  to characterize 
this  as  a  difference in "innovativeness." 
In this  study,  we distinguish  between early  use of 
technology that is  observed only because opportunities 
for adoption are more frequent and early use that 7 
reflects an early decision to  employ a  new technology. 
In particular, large firms  may adopt  innovations sooner 
for reasons that  have little to  do  with technological 
progressiveness, such  as  their  more  frequent capital 
additions to replace old (retired)  capacity or  to meet a 
given growth rate  in demand.5  We decompose the firm 
size  effect into a component that  influences a  firm's 
opportunities to  adopt  an innovation and a  component that 
affects its decision to  exercise an opportunity to 
introduce the new technology.6  This  explicit distinction 
Our notion of innovativeness  is  quite similar to 
Mansfield's (1968, p.  172)  argument that  large  firms 
should be interpreted as  being more progressive only if 
"the  difference in  the  speed of  response  between large 
and small firms  is  greater than would be  expected if  a 
large  firm acted  as  if  it were simply the  sum of  an 
equivalent number of  small,  independent  firms." 
An example may clarify our distinction.  Compare two 
utilities:  a  large  firm with 1000  megawatts (Mw)  of 
capacity and a  small  firm with 100 Mw  of capacity, each 
growing at  10 percent per year.  Assume that both will 
use the new technology at  the first  available oppor- 
tunity;  that is,  they  are equally "innovative."  If new 
units come in  100 Mw increments,  the  large  utility will 
build a  unit next year,  while  the small  utility may not 
build a  new unit for 10  years.  We attribute this  gap to 
differences in opportunities,  not to  differences in  the 
propensity to adopt new technologies. 
6 
Our decomposition also  can be interpreted as 
separating the factors that  affect the probability of 
observing a  firm's adoption decision from those  that 
affect the adoption decision itself.  In  this  sense,  the 
decomposition is  a  correction for sample selection 
biases. 8 
differentiates our work from  most previous empirical (and 
theoretical)  work on technology diffusion.7 
Finally,  a number of  factors  that  have received 
relatively little theoretical  attention also  may influ- 
ence interfirm diffusion  patterns.  These  include the 
role of human capital  investments  and labor  unions, 
regulatory distortions  of technology choices,  and 
deviations from  pure  profit-maximizing  objectives (for 
example,  by government-owned  firms or non-profit enti- 
ties).8  The predicted effects of  these  are context- 
specific.  For example,  some  forms of regulation  may 
speed technology diffusion (Hannan  and McDowell, 1984,  on 
banking regulation);  others may retard it  (Oster and 
Quigley, 1977,  on building codes).  Government ownership 
might allow technology-oriented  bureaucrats to adopt 
innovations sooner than would a profit-maximizing manage- 
ment;  in other cases,  the insulation from profit-maximi- 
zing pressures might  permit management to  lag in  techno- 
logy adoption (Wilson) 
Given the breadth of theoretical  predictions and 
their  dependence on  specific  assumptions about the nature 
7  .  .  .  -  Oster  (1982)  captures this  distinction  by using 
plants rather than firms  as  her unit of analysis.  She 
finds  that  steel plants owned by large  firms tend to  take 
longer to  adopt innovations  than do  plants owned by small 
firms,  other things equal. 
8  A number of  these  issues are raised  by Nelson and 
Winter (1982)  and Stoneman (1986). 9 
of  the  technology  and the  industry,  it  is useful to ask 
whether there  are any generalizations  that can be  drawn 
from the empirical literature.  Empirical tests  of 
interfirm diffusion models have tended to  focus  on 
possible 'Schumpeterian'  effects  of  firm  size and market 
structure on technology adoption decisions.  Early 
studies by Mansfield (1968),  Romeo  (1975),  and some of 
the case studies  in  Nasbeth and Ray (1974)  find that 
larger firns  tend to  adopt  innovations  sooner than do 
their  smaller counterparts, although  this  relation is  not 
universal.9  Much of  the  early  literature  was either 
largely qualitative or susceptible to  considerable 
statistical and methodological criticism,  however.  Many 
of the statistical analyses suffer from selectivity 
problems (e.g.,  Romeo,  1975,  uses  data only on adopting 
firns  in his  time-to-adoption  analysis) or from pooling 
across noncomparable innovations or  industries (see  the 
interindustry analysis  in Romeo,  1975,  and Benvignati, 
1982,  for examples). 
Recent work,  in  an effort to  address some  of these 
concerns, has  employed more  sophisticated  statistical 
models of  the  diffusion process.  The results continue to 
be  mixed,  suggesting that no simple generalizations may 
apply  in all industries,  aster (1982)  examines the 
For a number of innovations  studied in Nasbeth 
and Ray (1974),  small  firms  lead  large  firms  in techno- 
logy  adoption. 10 
diffusion of  the basic  oxygen furnace (BOF) and continu- 
ous  casting in the relatively concentrated  U.S.  steel 
industry.  She finds  a  negative effect of  firm  size on 
adoption probabilities; large  firms  tend to  adopt both 
innovations later than do smaller firms,  although the 
effect is  significant only for the BOF.  LLM (1987)  find 
negative effects of concentration on retail grocery 
stores'  decisions to  adopt optical scanner systems,  but 
positive effects of market share.  They report some 
evidence that  the largest chains are not  among  the first 
adopters, but their reliance on a  dummy variable for 
large  average store  size instead of measuring firm size 
makes it  difficult to  say much about firm size effects. 
In contrast, Hannan and McDowell (1984)  find  strong 
support for Schumpeterian  models of  innovation:  they 
conclude that  the probability of adopting automated 
teller machines (AIMs)  rises  with both firm  size and 
market concentration.  They also  find significant 
regulatory effects (ATM5 appear to  be used to  relax unit 
banking and branching restrictions) and ownership effect 
(banks owned by bank holding companies are more likely to 
adopt AIMs) .  Sommers  (1980)  concludes that large 
utilities and members of power pools are more  likely to 
try nuclear technologies,  although he  does  not look 11 
explicitly at  time  to  adoption and his econometric model 
creates some interpretation problemsJ° 
We  extend this body of empirical work in  a number of 
dimensions.  First,  almost all of  these  studies mix 
"innovativeness"  effects with "opportunity"  effects;  we 
explicitly differentiate  between these.  Second,  we 
consider flexible forms  for  the time  path of  diffusion. 
Much of the empirical  work to  date  has assumed that  the 
"hazard rate," or  probability of adopting an innovation 
conditional on not having already adopted it,  is  constant 
or nonotonically increasing through time  after condition- 
ing on utility characteristics.  Finally,  adding evidence 
on  the determinants of adoption decisions in  the  electric 
utility industry  may help economists to  better understand 
differential effects of  factors  like  firm size  across 
industries.  To  accomplish this,  we  first  must describe 
how these  factors  are likely to  influence the  innovations 
we  study. 
10  Sommers  uses a  logit model to  estimate the 
choice between coal  and nuclear technologies conditional 
on building, but he uses only one observation per 
utility:  the first adoption (for adopters) or last non- 
adoption (for  non-adopters) decision.  Utility character- 
istics are measured in the year of that decision, 
implicitly assuming that  characteristics that  affect 
adoption decisions vary through time but that  the time 
path of  characteristics prior to  the adoption decision is 
irrelevant.  These features  make  it  difficult to  compare 
his results to  those  of other studies. 12 
3.  Technological Innovation in  Steam Electric Generating 
Technology.  1950-1980 
In  an  earlier paper (Joskow  and Rose,  1985),  we 
argued that  technological advances  in fossil-fueled 
electricity generation over  the past  thirty years have 
focused on improving the design thermal efficiency of 
generating units  by increasing their  steam operating 
pressures.  Increases in  thermal  efficiency reduce 
operating costs  by enabling utilities to generate more 
electricity from  a  given amount of  fuel.  Our 1985  study 
identified two significant steam generating technologies 
introduced after  1950:  high pressure subcritical units 
operating at  steam pressures around 2400  psi and very 
high pressure supercritical  units operating above 3206 
psiJ'  These technologies are  the focus  of the present 
analysis. 
The previous theoretical and empirical literature on 
technology diffusion suggests  at  least  five  factors that 
are likely to  affect the pattern of inter-utility 
11  At pressures abve the critical level  of 3206 
psi,  water heated to  706 F  directly  vaporizes to dry 
steam.  Increasing steam pressure is  one way to  increase 
design thermal efficiency.  This  admittedly is  only one 
dimension over  which generating  unit technology has been 
improved,  however.  Others include higher steam tempera- 
tures,  the introduction of  reheat cycles and multiple 
bleed point preheat cycles,  and larger  unit sizes.  In 
our 1985  paper,  we  argue  that  technological  progress in 
thermal efficiency over the last 25  years  has focused on 
raising steam pressure conditions.  This emphasis is 
maintained in  our present study. 13 
adoption of  these  technologies.  These include:  the 
expected cost  savings,  uncertainty over the distribution 
of expected savings,  utility size,  utility ownership 
structure, and time.12  We describe their anticipated 
effects below. 
We  expect the speed of adoption to be  increasing in 
average fuel  costs.  At their introduction,  both techno- 
logies were expected to  reduce operating Costs  by 
enhancing fuel  efficiency.  While the design efficiency 
gains  were relatively modest (on the order  of  2  to  5 
percent), the significance of the ex  ante  cost  savings 
depended on  the utility's expected cost  of fuel over  the 
life  of  the generating unit.  These  costs  vary consider- 
ably across utilities.13  For the  144 utilities in our 
12  We ignore potential differences in  the  regula- 
tory environment across IOIJs  and focus  instead on 
differences in ownership structures.  Since  municipal and 
cooperative utilities are not regulated in  the  same  sense 
as  are  lOUs,  any differences  between the groups may 
reflect both organizational  and regulatory effects.  All 
investor-owned utilities face essentially the  same 
general form of  regulation.  Within this  general struc- 
ture  the  regulatory environment  of course varies over 
time  and space.  These  differences are difficult to 
characterize empirically, however,  and we  do  not believe 
that variables reflecting such differences are  likely to 
be correlated with the  independent  variables that  we  use. 
It may be worthwhile to  introduce  measures of  variations 
in  the  competitive and regulatory environment in  future 
research.  Absent this,  our results should be  interpreted 
as  measuring the influence of  the observed factors  in  the 
presence of regulated local monopoly markets. 
13 
Transportation costs  can account for a  high 
fraction of delivered coal costs,  implying  that  locations 
near high quality coal  sources may face  substantially 
lower  costs. 14 
sample,  the ratio of highest to  lowest average fuel cost 
per million Btus  was 325 percent in  1962  and 393 percent 
in  1972.  Such  differences in  fuel  costs  should contri- 
bute to  significant  variation itt  the relative attrac- 
tiveness of the new technologies. 
Theoretical models suggest that  greater uncertainty 
about a  technology's potential  will lead to  a  slower 
diffusion path,  all else  equal.  Although data are not 
available to  construct a  direct test  of  the  influence of 
uncertainty on adoption patterns, some  insight may be 
gained  by comparing diffusion paths  across the  two 
technologies.  The 2400 psi units  constitute a  signi- 
ficant improvement  over pre-existing  subcritical techno- 
logy although they were not a  major departure from that 
technology; the  supercritical  units  represent a more 
radical change from previous boiler technologies.14 
This dichotomy suggests that  the uncertainty surrounding 
the ex  ante  costs and benefits of  adopting the super- 
critical technology is  likely to  have been considerably 
larger than the uncertainty associated  with adopting the 
2400 psi subcritical technology.  We would expect this  to 
shrink the adoption  probabilities for  the supercritical 
technology and lead to  a  slower diffusion path. 
14 
Operating at supercritical  pressures eliminates 
the need for a  substantial amount of equipment associated 
with saturated ("wet")  steam,  but requires more advanced 
materials and designs to  handle the considerable increase 
in steam pressure. 15 
The expected speed  of diffusion also  is  dampened by 
the embodiment of generating technology in very long- 
lived capital equipment.  Capital costs  of powerplants 
are  large  relative to  operating  costs  and plants are 
designed to  have useful lives of thirty years or  more. 
As power plants age their  utilization patterns typically 
change,  moving from base load to  cycling to  peaking 
operation.  Additions of  new generating capacity are 
driven primarily by increases in electrical load,  rather 
than by opportunities to  replace existing capacity with 
capacity that  has significantly lower  operating costs.15 
Although both 2400  psi and supercritical technologies 
were expected to  lower  the total  cost  of generating 
electricity, neither promised sufficient savings to 
warrant scrapping existing facilities  and replacing them 
with new generating units.16  This  will tend to  slow 
diffusion of both technologies  and implies that we will 
observe a  utility's decision to  adopt  one of  these 
15 
Obviously, generating  capacity eventually is 
retired,  so that retirements  have some  effect on  the 
demand for additional capacity.  During our  sample 
period, however,  capacity additions dwarf retirements. 
For  example in  1970,  28,000  megawatts (Mw)  of  new 
generating capacity was added,  while only 1,000 Mw was 
retired.  Edison Electric Institute Statistical  Yearbook 
of  the Electric Utility Industry/1983,  page 12. 
16  This is  in  sharp  contrast to Oster's (1982) 
finding on the economics of replacing existing steel 
furnace technology  with the basic  oxygen furnace. 16 
technologies only when the utility decides to  add new 
baseload capacity.17 
There are a  number of channels  through which firm 
size might influence innovativeness.  First,  larger 
utilities are more likely to  have internal engineering, 
design and maintenance staffs  that  are both interested in 
and capable of adopting new technologies  before substan- 
tial  experience  has been gained  with them  (Joskow and 
Rose,  1985).  Second,  larger  utilities are  likely to  be 
less  averse to  the risks  of early  adoption.  For utili- 
ties  with a  large  portfolio of generating  units, the 
impact of  a  "mistake" on  the cost  of service and overall 
profitability will be modest.18  Third,  if  there  are 
economies that lead to  lower  costs when more plants of a 
given technology are operated  by  a  single firm,  larger 
17  We assume here and throughout the paper that  a 
utility's decision to  add new baseload capacity is 
independent of  its  technology  choice.  This  corresponds 
to  an assumption that utilities first  decide their 
schedule of additions, based primarily on demand growth 
projections and unit retirement  schedules, and then 
decide what type of units to build to  meet their addi- 
tions  schedule.  This  assumption  may not strictly hold; 
if new technologies are scale-augmenting,  technology 
choice may have some  effect on building schedules.  Even 
in  this  case,  the increase in efficient size is  unlikely 
to  be  large  relative to  the  size  of  the  "average" 
generating unit.  We  therefore  maintain the independence 
assumption as approximately  correct,  and believe that 
accounting for potential correlations is  unlikely to 
yield additional insight. 
18 
If the cost  impact is  small  relative to  total 
costs, regulators are  less  likely to  notice or penalize a 
utility in regulatory rate hearings. 17 
firms  may find early  adoption  more attractive.  We find 
some  evidence of  this  type  of  economy in our earlier work 
(Joskow and Rose,  1985):  there  appears to  be modest 
learning-by-doing that  may lower  construction costs as  a 
utility gains  experience with a  given technology. 
Finally,  if  new technologies are scale  augmenting, they 
may be more attractive to  larger utilities that  can 
economically add capacity in  large  chunks.19 
We  also  expect larger utilities to  build new 
generating units of any kind more  frequently than do 
smaller utilities,  ceteris paribus.  This  will result 
from the  relationship  between size,  growth rates,  and the 
lumpiness of generating units.  Thus,  there  may be  a 
natural numerical relationship  between size  and speed of 
adoption that  arises not from  differences in  the propen- 
sity to adopt new technologies  but instead from differ- 
ences  in economic opportunities to  add new capacity.  As 
a  result,  failing to  account for differential  building 
frequencies may induce a  positive  correlation  between 
firm size and the  estimated speed  of  adoption, even if 
the true relation is  a  positive effect of size on  the 
probability of building but no  effect of  size  on  the 
probability of adoption conditional on building. 
Distinguishing between these  two effects is  critical to 
the  interpretation of  the results.  We  are not aware of 
19  But see note  16,  sura. 18 
any other work that  controls  for  the opportunity to  adopt 
as  we  do  here. 
Ownership structure may affect adoption probabili- 
ties  although the direction  of  the predicted effect is 
ambiguous.  There  are three  types  of  utilities in  our 
sample:  investor-owned (private)  utilities, government- 
owned utilities (primarily  municipal utilities) and 
cooperatives (primarily rural electric cooperatives) 
The largest group is  the investor-owned  utilities, which 
are most likely to  behave as  profit-maximizing firms.20 
Municipal utilities ("munis")  and cooperatives ("coops") 
may have objectives other  than profit-maximization that 
alter their behavior relative  to  that  of investor-owned 
utilities.  Munis and coops  also  appear to  be  less  likely 
to be involved in R&D activities:  73%  of investor-owned 
utilities belong to  the Electric Power  Research Institute 
(EPRI),  as compared to  only 37% of munis and 32%  of  coops 
(EPRI,  1987,  p.l).  We expect most of  these  differences 
to  lower  innovation probabilities for munis  and coops. 
There could be offsetting considerations,  however.  If 
government-owned utilities are more responsive to  the 
20 
Regulatory lag and opportunities to make 
wholesale transactions that  are  subject to relatively 
loose regulatory constraints (Joskow  and Schmalensee, 
1983)  provide incentives to  adopt  cost-saving techno- 
logies.  Since  new generating technologies tend to  be 
more capital-intensive than  older  generating tech- 
nologies, rate  of return regulation may provide addi- 
tional incentives (Smith,  1974). 19 
interests of power plant engineers,  for example,  we might 
expect greater  pressures to  adopt new technologies 
(Joskow,  1976).  We expect this  to  be  of potential 
significance only  for the  largest  government-  or coopera- 
tively-owned utilities. 
Finally,  the expected pattern of diffusion through 
time  is  unlikely to  be monotonic.  While much of the 
literature posits constant or increasing  hazard rates,  we 
expect that  adoption probabilities  will increase ini- 
tially and then decline for both of  our  innovations.  The 
technologies  we explore co-exist in  time  with each other 
and with older  (lower  pressure) technologies.  Although 
the 2400  psi  technology  was developed  before the  super- 
critical technology,  for a  large part of  the  sample 
period the  2400  psi  and supercritical technologies 
represent competing choices.21  This  suggests that the 
probability of adoption for 2400  psi units  may decline 
after  some date  as  utilities decide to  "skip"  a  genera- 
tion  of technology and move immediately  to  the newer 
supercricical technology.  Declines in  the  adoption 
probability for the supereritical  technology are likely 
to  arise  not from the  development  of  more  advanced 
21  .  .  A  number of utilities reverted to  older techno- 
logies after building one or more units  with the newer 
technology.  For reasons discussed  below,  this  result may  be expected for  the supercritical technology.  Less 
explicable is  its occurrence for the 2400 psi technology. 20 
technologies but from unexpected problems with super- 
critical units.  The development of substantial reliabil- 
ity problems and unexpectedly  high maintenance costs for 
supercritical units  during the mid-1970s appear to  have 
reduced or  eliminated the expected savings from this 
technology (Joskow  and Rose,  1985,  and Joskow and 
Schmalensee, 1987).  Adoption probabilities for  super- 
critical technologies should  have decreased after  these 
problems were realized.22 
In  summary,  we expect adoption probabilities for 
each of the two  technologies  considered in this  paper to 
be  increasing in  firm  size  and fuel costs.  The predicted 
effect of ownership structure is  ambiguous, although it 
seems  likely that the probability of adopting an  innova- 
tion will be higher for investor-owned  utilities than it 
is  for government and cooperatively owned utilities. 
Finally,  we  expect that  adoption probabilities will vary 
through time,  initially  rising as  uncertainties about  the 
technology are  resolved and costs  decline and ultimately 
falling as even newer technologies  become available. 
4.  Statistical  Models of Technolozy Adoption 
The  empirical literature  has used a variety of 
approaches to  estimate models of technology  diffusion. 
22  One might expect this  to increase the adoption 
probability for 2400  technologies, although there is 
little evidence of this  in  the data. 21 
We discuss below two  of  the most  popular classes of 
models with the assumptions implicit  in  their  use.  These 
are models based on normal probability distributions, 
including probit and Tobit  analyses, and those  based on 
failure time  or  hazard rate  specifications.  We  also 
describe a  statistical  model of technology adoption that 
we believe distinguishes firm  size  effects on  "innova- 
tiveness" from firm  size  effects  on adoption oppor- 
tunities better than have most previous  models. 
Common to  our paper and much of  the literature on 
technology diffusion is  a  focus  on  time  to  transition or 
first  use of  a new technology,  not  on  technology choice 
se.  In  line  with this,  we characterize firms  as 
being either in  the  "no adoption" state,  prior  to  their 
first  use of  the new technology,  or  in  the "adoption" 
state,  once the  technology  has been used and forever 
after.23  This  emphasis is  appropriate if  one  is  con- 
cerned with how long  it  takes  firms  in an  industry  to  try 
a  new technology rather than with how long  it  takes  firms 
to  convert their entire production lines  to  the new 
technology.  This  approach seems  of particular interest 
23  As  such,  our paper belongs in  the literature on 
interfirm diffusion patterns; see Hannan and McDowell 
(1984)  and LLM (1987)  for other  recent examples  of  this 
type  of  study.  Intrafirm diffusion  patterns-- the 
penetration of innovations within firms--  have been 
subject to  less  empirical study. 22 
for  industries such  ss  electric utilities,  in which 
technology is  embodied in long-lived  capital.24 
We  also  assume  that  a  utility's probability of 
adoption is  related to  its characteristics, such  as  size 
and average fuel  cost,  as  of  some  point in  time;  cross- 
sectional differences in  these  characteristics drive  the 
differences in  utility adoption dates.  Variations in 
adoption rates  through time  are determined  by forces 
comnon to  all utilities,  such  as  the number of  other 
firms  adopting the technology,  improvements in  the 
technology through time,  or  resolution of uncertainties 
about the technology's costs  and benefits.  Using this 
assumption, which typifies much of  the empirical work in 
this area,  we work with models that  specify the adoption 
probability as:  Pr(utility i  adopting at  time  t)  — f 
(X.,t),  where X.  are utility i's characteristics  measured 
at some time  common to  all utilities. 
Normal probability models 
A number of studies have  used a  normal probability 
distribution to analyze the time  until adoption for firms 
or plants, measured from  some  initial  date  of 
24 
If  capital is  long-lived and operating costs  are 
low relative to capital costs,  replacement of capacity is 
likely to be slow even if  firms  are  aware  of technologi- 
cal advances and prepared to  adopt them as soon as  it  is 
profitable to  do  so. 23 
availability.25  This model was implicit in early 
studies that  used OLS regressions to  estimate the 
determinants of interfirm differences in adoption dates 
(c.f. Mansfield, 1968,  and Romeo,  1975).  A significant 
shortcoming in many early studies is  the failure to 
account for sample selection or censoring  problems: 
firms  that  had not adopted the new technology  by the  end 
of the  sample  period frequently  were  excluded from the 
analysis (Romeo,  1975)  or treated as  never adopting. 
These  biases can be eliminated by including  both adopters 
and non-adopters in  the sample and using a Tobit model to 
treat end-of-sample censoring on adoption dates;  see 
Oster (1982)  for a  study using this  technique. 
A  second potential problem arises from the normal 
distribution's range  over (-,÷).  Presumably  a  tech- 
nology cannot  be  adopted prior  to  some  innovation date, 
implying that  the  time  until  adoption is  distributed over 
(0,  +)  ,  where  time  is  set equal  to  0  in  the year that 
the technology first becomes available.  The statistical 
analysis could account for  this  either  by treating the 
distribution as  a left-truncated  normal or by transfor- 
ming the model.  We find the latter course most appealing 
and  in  our empirical work with the normal probability 
model assume that the log of  the time to adoption is 
25  One could as  easily  measure time since  adoption, 
counting backward from the end-of-sample date  (see  Oster, 
1982). 24 
distributed as  a normal random  variable,  with right 
censoring at  the end-of-sample  date.26 
To derive the  likelihood  function  based on  this 
distributional  assumption,  define the set of exogenous 
variables that affect firn  i's  adoption  decision  as  X., 
firm i's time until  adoption as  t, and the end-of-sample 
censoring  date  as T.  We  also  define  X.  = -X.  as  a 
—1  1 
normalization to  ease  the comparison  between this  model 
and the other models discussed  below,  where  the time  to 
adoption is  a  decreasing  function  of X.$  and  fi  is  the 
paraneter vector from  the normal  probability  model. 
Given these assumptions,  the  likelihood  function is: 
-  -  N1  N2 
(1)  Pr(t1  tN) 
= II  ( ( (t. 
-  Xfl)/a ) /a)  fl  [1 
-  ) 
j=1  k=1 
where 
-  denotes  the natural log of  the time  variable, N1 
is  the set of  firms  that  adopt  on or before the end-of- 
sample date,  N2 
is  the set of  firms  that have not adopted 
by time  T,  and N = 
N1  + 
N2.  The parameters  fi  and  a  can 
be  estimated  by maximum likelihood  methods. 
This model  does  not assume any explicit time 
dependence in  the adoption  probability; systematic 
26  This  follows  from an assumption  that  the  time  to 
adoption is  distributed  as  a  log-normal  random  variable. 25 
variations in adoption dates are  attributable only to 
variations in  firms'  characteristics (X).  The model 
does,  however  assume that the  "critical" level  of X  n 
above which firms choose to adopt the technology, 
declines through time.  This  can be  seen most easily by 
recognizing that the expected time  to  adoption is 
declining in X:  E(t.X)  in 
+  52  — -X  +  5a2 
This feature of the model is  consistent with the  assump- 
tions  built into  most theoretical models of technology 
diffusion that  the cost of adoption or perceived riski- 
ness of the technology declines over  time. 
Hazard rate  models 
A second class  of models used to analyze technology 
diffusion is based on failure time or hazard rate 
specifications (1-{annan  and McDowell, 1984,  and LLM, 
1987).  The hazard rate,  h.(t) ,  is  defined as the 
probability that  firm i  will adopt  an innovation at time 
c  conditional on having not adopted the  innovation before 
t.  Because  these models explicitly focus  on transition 
probabilities,  they  seem particularly suited to study 
patterns of technology adoption across firms.27 
27  See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980)  for descrip- 
tions  of failure time  models and their  applications. 
Hazard rate  models have been used extensively to  model 
unemployment dynamics; see Lancaster (1979)  and Nickell 
(1979)  for early applications. 26 
Although particular distributional assumptions on 
the hazard rate vary across applications, the models 
share  a  common structure.  The unconditional probability 
that  firm i will adopt the  innovation at time t  (the 
density function) is  equal  to: 
t 
(2)  fjt) =  h.(t)  exp(-  5 h.(r)dr) 
r=O 
and the probability that  firm i will not adopt the 
innovation prior to  t  (the  "survivor" function) is  equal 
to 
t 
(2)  1  -  F(t)  -  exp(-5  h.(r)dr) 
r=O 
To  estimate this  model,  the form of the hazard rate must 
be  specified.  In principle, virtually any function that 
satisfies the properties of  a  conditional probability 
could be  used.  For concreteness, we consider two 
specifications of the hazard rate. 
The proportional hazards model is  perhaps the most 
widely used specification; in  the diffusion literature, 
LLM  (1987)  use this model to estimate the diffusion of 
optical scanners among retail grocery stores.  The 
proportional hazards model assumes that  the relative 
hazard rates  for  two  firms  are constant through time, 
allowing the hazard to  be decomposed into  separate firm 27 
and time  components.  We can write  this  as  h(t) — 
h0(t)exp(Xj,  where h0(t)  specifies the  evolution of  the 
hazard rate over time and X.  are fixed firm characteris- 
1 
tics.  The time component can be estimated non-para- 
metrically (see  LLM,  1987)  or parametrically by assuming 
some distribution for h0(t).  Our estimates of  the 
proportional hazard model  parameterize h0(t) using the 
Weibull distribution:  h0(t)  at1.  Under this  assump- 
tion,  the likelihood function for the data is: 
N2 
N1 
a-i  a 
(4)  Pr(tl,..,tN)_llwa.t. 
) 
II  exp(-exp(Xk)T 
j—l 
k—i 
where N  and N  are as defined earlier and  and a  are 
1  2  w  w 
the parameters of the Weibull proportional hazards model. 
The adoption probability is  increasing in X;  the 
hazard rate  will be monotonically increasing,  decreasing 
or constant through time  as  a  is  greater than,  less  than, 
or equal to one. 
Alternatives to  the proportional hazards model allow 
the  relative probabilities of adoption across firms  to 
change through time.  This can be accomplished either by 
allowing time-varying firm characteristics to affect 
adoption probabilities (see  Hannan and McDowell, 1984)  or 28 
by  interacting time  and firm  effects.28  To  allow us  to 
compare resuLts across different  models, we choose the 
latter approach.  Je  specify the hazard rate as  follow- 
ing a  log-logistic distribution: 
a  -l  a 
(5)  h.(t)  = 
met 
e  exp(X.) /  (1  + 
e  exp(X.) 
where subscript e  denotes estimates from the log-logistic 
hazard model.  This specification allows us  to estimate 
the hazard as  a  function of  the constant firm charac- 
teristics (X) used to  estimate the Tobit and Weibull 
diffusion models discussed above.  As  in  the Weibull 
hazard model,  the adoption probability is  increasing in 
X..  The log-logistic specification implies a monotone 
decreasing hazard rate  if a  ￿  1  and a  hazard that  is 
initially increasing then decreasing for a  > 1.  This 
latter characteristic is  particularly appealing for our 
data.  The log-likelihood associated with this  specifica- 
tion is: 
N  a 
(6)  LLe —E { (1-a.)[  ln(a)  + (a-l)ln(ti)  *  -  21n(1  + 
e 
I 
exp(X,9))  I  -  aln(1 + TCexp(X.fl)  } 
28  Hannan and McDowell assume that the adoption 
probability conditional on  is  constant through time, 
although changes in  over time  may increase or decrease 
the  adoption probabilLty for a firm. 29 
where a.  is  a dummy variable equal to one for utilities 
that do  not adopt the new technology  by T,  zero other- 
wise 
Models conditional on building (double-censored models) 
All of the models described above assume that  date 
at  which utilities would choose to  adopt the new technol- 
ogy is  known and that  the variables included in X affect 
firms'  adoption decisions but not their adoption oppor- 
tunities.  As  described earlier,  we  think these assump- 
tions  are unlikely to  be  satisfied either in our data set 
or  in  most  technology diffusion studies.29  In parti- 
cular,  we  expect large  firms  to  build generating units 
more  frequently than  do  small  firms,  generating spurious 
correlations between firm size  and adoption probabilities 
in  the earlier models. 
This is  illustrated in  figure 1.  Denote the latent 
(unobserved) adoption value for firm i  at  time  t  by 
A(X.,t).  Firm i  will adopt  the new technology at  the 
first  opportunity after  A(X,t) ￿  A*,  where A* is  the 
"critical" level required for adoption.  Each time  we 
observe the  utility building a  new unit we learn one  of 
two things.  Either the utility uses  an old technology, 
29  Similar assumptionsare  implicit in many studies 
of unemployment transitions, in which job offers are 
assumed to  arrive independently of variables included in 
x. 30 
in which case we know A(X.,t)  <  A*,  or the utility adopts 
the new technology, in which case  we know A(Xt) ￿ 
Censoring occurs when a utility does  not build each year. 
Let t*  be  the  date  at  which A(X.,t) ￿ A*.  We know that 
t*  lies  somewhere between the  date  of  the  last  old unit 
(t0)  and the date of  the first  new unit (t1) 
.  For 
utilities that  build frequently, the gap between t0 and 
will tend to  be  small  and t1 will be  quite  close  to  t* 
(see t  and t1 in figure 1).  For utilities that build 
infrequently, the  gap between t0 and t1  may be  large, 
suggesting that 
t1  may greatly exceed t*  (see t0 and t15 
in figure 1). 
If  we have data  on  the units built before the 
utility adopts the new technology,  as well as  the date at 
which the utility first  uses  the new technology, we can 
correct this censoring bias  by estimating adoption 
probabilities conditional on building a  new unit. 
Consider a panel data set with observations on each 
utility over time.  For each  year,  we observe one of 
three outcomes:  the utility builds a  unit and adopts the 
new technology, the utility builds a unit but does not 
adopt the new technology, or the utility does  not build 
30  Since  we  are  interested in time to first use, 
not in technology choice per se,  we only need to observe 
building decisions until the first new technology unit is 
constructed. 31 
any unit.31  This  suggests a  full  likelihood function of 
the form: 
(6)  Pr(u11, 
. . .u1,) 
—  IT  pr(utility  I builds at  t)  pr(A(X,t)  A*) 
it 
N1 
II  pr(utility  i builds at t)  •  pr(A(X., t) < A*) 
lt  N 
II pr(utility  i does not build  at  r) 
It  N3 
where u. 
is  an observation on utility i's  generating 
unit choice in  year  is  the  set  of  utility-year 
observations in which utilities build and adopt the new 
technology, N2 
is  the  set of utility-year observations in 
which utilities build but do not adopt  the new technol- 
ogy,  N3  is  the set of utility-year observations in which 
utilities do not build any units,  and N1 + 
N2 
+ 
N3  NT. 
We choose a  probit specification to model building 
probabilities for each utility and a  log-logistic  hazard 
specification to  model the  evolution of  the  latent 
32 
adoption probabilities.  We assume, as  discussed in 
note 17,  that  utilities' building decisions are 
independent of  their  adoption decisions.  This  implies 
31 
After a  utility builds a unit with the new 
technology it  is  considered to  be  in  the  adoption state 
for the  rest of  the  sample. 
32 
Any of  the  other  models could be used to  model 
the adoption probability; we choose the  log-logistic 
hazard because  it  is  the most flexible of  the models we 
consider. 32 
yields the log-likelihood for the  double-censored model: 
(7)  LL1  { 
5.  a. (1n((Z.W)) 
+ a1n(t)  + 
i1  t=1 
-  ln(1  + ttexp(X.fl)) 
)  ÷  b.jl 
- 
(  1n((Z.W)) -  ln(1  + t  exS(X.1)) 
] 
+  -  (Z.W)) } 
where  b. 
is  a  dummy variable equal  to  one  if utility i 
builds a unit at time t,  0  otherwise;  a. 
is  a  dummy 
variable equal  to  zero before the utility adopts the  new 
technology and one during all  other  years; 
'I'  are the 
parameters of  the variables 1  in  the building probit;  and 
the  subscript f  denotes estimates from  the full-maximum 
likelihood,  double-censored model. 
Under the independence assumption, this  likelihood 
function is  separable in  the building and adoption 
probabilities.33  We can therefore estimate the para- 
meters of  the adoption decision  by estimating the 
probability of adoption conditional on building.  In  this 
light,  the biases of  the conventional adoption models 
33  While the  independence  assumption may not be 
strictly true,  we believe it  is  approximately correct for 
this industry and that  little  would be gained from the 
complexity introduced by allowing for correlated errors. 33 
discussed above  arise  from sample selection biases: 
these  models censor observations in which utilities 
decide to  build but not adopt  the new technology.  While 
sophisticated applications of  the conventional models 
recognize that the  adoption date for non-adopters is 
right-censored at  the end of  the  sample date,  the 
applications generally fail  to  treat  the left-censoring 
that  arises because utiities' adoption decisions are not 
observed until they build a new unit.34 
In the following section,  we  report results using 
each of  the  four  specifications  we have developed: 
Tobit,  Weibull proportional hazards, log-logistic hazard, 
and hazard models conditional on  building.  We  expect the 
first  three  specifications to  yield qualitatively similar 
results,  although the  magnitude and interpretation of the 
coefficients will  vary across  the models, due primarily 
to their different implicit assumptions on the evolution 
of the hazard rate  through time.  The results from these 
models indicate what our estimates would be if we used 
the techniques common in  the diffusion literature.  We 
are most interested in comparing these estimates to  those 
from the model that conditions on building decisions, 
which we consider to  be  a  more correct specification for 
An equivalent statistical treatment for the bias 
is  to write the  likelihood function as  a left-  and right- 
censored hazard model, in  which we  observe tO  and tl  for 
each utility,  and estimate the likelihood function over 
N:  IT  Pr(tO  < t*  ￿  ti). 34 
our problem.  Differences between the  first  three  sets of 
results and those of  the double censored problem will 
provide information on the significance of  the biases 
introduced by assuming that adoption (or observation) 
opportunities are  randomly distributed across firms, 
independently of variables that  affect adoption probabil- 
ities.  While estimates of  the building probability are 
not required to  estimate the adoption parameters, we  also 
report results from building probit equations to illus- 
trate the influence of size on adoption opportunities. 
5.  Data and Results 
The statistical models developed in  the previous 
section are estimated using data on  the building deci- 
sions  and technology choices of 144 electric utilities 
over  the  1950  through 1980  period.  In  this  section,  we 
first describe the  data  used in  the analysis and present 
descriptive statistics on  the patterns of technology 
adoption in the industry.  We next report estimates of 
adoption patterns for the  2400  psi technology and compare 
the  results across different statistical specifications; 
the corresponding results for the  supercritical techno- 
logy follow.  The section concludes by discussing what we 
learn from the various statistical  models. 
Data and descriptive statistics 35 
Our data set Consists  of information on  a  census of 
144  electric utilities that built one or more fossil- 
fired steam turbine generating  units between 1950 and 
l98O.  For  these  utilities, we collected information 
on  the  date  and technology type  of all fossil-fuel steam 
turbine capacity additions, firm  size in  megawatts of 
capacity, capac.ty growth rates,  average fuel  cost  per 
million Btus,  and type  of ownership (investor,  municipal, 
federal,  or cooperative). 
We define X,  the  set of exogenous variables that 
affect a  utility's adoption decision, to  include four 
variables:  firm  size,  type  of ownership, average fuel 
cost,  and (perhaps)  time.  To  allow for nonlinear 
effects of firm size,  we  include  both size  and size- 
squared in  the equations.  The building equation models a 
utility's decision to  build zero  versus one  or  more units 
in  a  given year.  We  assume  that  Z,  the  set of variables 
that influence a  utility's  building decision, includes 
the utility's size,  growth rate,  ownership structure 
(perhaps),  and time.  The model  allows for nonlinear size 
effects and time  trends by  including quadratic terms  in 
both utility size and time. 
Missing data forced us  to exclude from the 
sample three  utilities that  built coal-fired generating 
units during this  period.  The utilities included in  the 
sample constructed 1091  units  between 1950 and 1980, 
which comprise virtually all fossil-fired steam turbine 
capacity added during the  sample period. 36 
As discussed earlier,  the adoption models are based 
on  a  constant X.  for each firm,  raising the question of 
when the  characteristics should be measured.36  We 
consider two  dates:  1960  and 1970  (due  to data collec- 
tion requirements, fuel  prices are observed two years 
after each of  these  dates).37  The first of these  allows 
us  to  measure firm characteristics  part-way through the 
diffusion process for the  2400  psi  technology and before 
the  diffusion process really begins for the  supercritical 
technology.  If utilities are  forward-looking, 1960  may 
be too nyopic.  We  therefore consider 1970 as  an alterna- 
tive.  As  there  is  no  strong theoretical  basis for 
choosing between these,  we allow the data to decide which 
is  more appropriate. 
Before presenting results from tightly parameterized 
statistical models of  the  diffusion  process it  may be 
instructive to  examine some  simple  descriptive statistics 
on  the  data.  Table 1  reports  means  and standard devia- 
tions  for the variables used in the statistical analysis. 
As indicated, the  2400  psi technology had diffused quite 
widely through the  industry by  1980,  with 93  utilities 
(65 percent) adopting this  technology by  the end of  the 
36  .  .  .  .  .  Building  probabilities may be  a  function of 
constant or time-varying firm  characteristics. 
The choice of  dates  is  somewhat arbitrary; we 
were influenced by data availability in selecting these 
two  candidates. 37 
sample.  The supercritical technology achieved much more 
limited diffusion, with only 39  utilities (27  percent) 
adopting the supercritical technology  by 1980. 
This pattern is  amplified in  table  2,  which reports 
the distribution of technology type  for the  1091  genera- 
ting units  included in our sample.  The  table  highlights 
the  co-existence of both old and new technologies over 
long periods:  units  --tinue  to  be built using old lower 
pressure technologies twenty or more years  after newer 
technologies have been introduced.  The relative domi- 
nance of different technologies does  shift over time, 
however.  The 2400  psi technology supplanted lower 
pressure technologies as  the modal choice by the mid- 
l960s  and was itself superceded by  the  supercritical 
technology during the  early l970s.  As noted earlier, 
however,  the 2400 psi  technology re-emerged as  the 
leading technology during the  last part of  the  1970s, 
most likely in  response to  increasing dissatisfaction 
with the operating performance of supercritical units. 
The differences in  the diffusion path  of  the  2400 
psi and supercritical technologies may be  illustrated 
best by  a  graph of  the  diffusion paths.  Figure 2  plots 
nonparametric (Kaplan-Meier)  estimates of  the  survivor 
function for each of  the  two  technologies (see 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980).  As  indicated by the 
bottom curve,  the probability of adopting the  2400 psi 38 
technology is  quite  small  until after 1956.  From 1957, 
the hazard rate (which is  proportional to the slope  of 
the curve) looks  fairly constant and relatively large. 
Although it  flattens  somewhat in  the mid-1970s, it 
returns to  the previous rate  by the end of the period, 
suggesting that continued penetration of  the  technology 
through the remaining 34  percent of  the utilities is 
likely. 
The picture is  quite  different for the supercritical 
technology.  The hazard rates  are  small  until the mid- 
l960s,  increase substantially for  a  5  year period,  and 
then decline again in  the early l970s.  Virtually no 
utilities adopted this  technology after 1975  and it  seems 
likely that the technology will never penetrate much 
beyond the  27  percent adoption level achieved by l98O. 
With these  diffusion patterns in mind,  we now turn to 
parametric estimates of adoption probabilities, to 
determine whether systematic differences across utilities 
explain the positions of individual firms  along the 
diffusion curves. 
Results for the  2400  psi technology 
38  .  .  In  future work,  one might wish to modify the 
likelihood function to  allow the cumulative probability 
of adopting this technology to asymptote over time to 
some level considerably less  than one. 39 
In  this  section,  we first examine Tobit,  propor- 
tional hazards, and log-logistic hazard estimates for the 
diffusion of  the 2400 psi technology.39  These allow our 
results to  be compared to  those  of other diffusion 
studies, most of which use a variant of  one  of  these 
models.  After discussing these  .lts,  we examine 
estimates from the hazard model conditional on building 
to determine the  extent of biases introduced by the 
exclusion of adoption opportunity information from the 
first  three  models. 
Table 3  reports results from the first three models. 
As  discussed earlier,  the exogenous variables in the 
models are utility size  and its square,  the  utility's 
average fuel  cost,  ownership dummy variables for coops 
and government-owned utilities, and time.  Because 
specifications that measure utility size  by 1970  capacity 
outperform those that  use 1960  measures of  size,  only the 
former are reported.4°  The first three  columns report 
Tobit, Weibull proportional hazards,  and log-logistic 
hazards results using 1962  average fuel  prices.  The 
All the  likelihood functions used in  this  study 
were programmed in Fortran and estimated using a  maximum 
likelihood routine based on the BHHH algorithm.  We  are 
grateful to Hank Farber for providing us with the code 
for his optimization routine. 
40  The results using 1960 size measures are quite 
similar,  but the  standard errors tend to  be  somewhat 
larger and the  fit of the equation somewhat poorer than 
in  the  corresponding equations that use  1970  capacity. 40 
second three  columns report similar specifications using 
1972  average fuel  prices.  Since  the Tobit nfodel  impli- 
citly assumes a constant hazard through time,  time is  not 
included in  the Tobit specifications. 
The results are quite similar across all six 
specifications.  Firm size  has  a  strong,  significant, 
positive effect on adoption probabilities.  Larger firms 
are likely to adopt the  technology earlier than are 
smaller firms, although there  are diminishing returns as 
indicated by the negative coefficient on  the  size-squared 
term.  The quadratic peaks  at  8,500 to 10,000 Mw of 1970 
capacity, substantially above  the sample mean of 1,900 Mw 
but not beyond the sample size  range.  This  suggests that 
for a few large  utilities, size  has a  net negative effect 
on adoption probabilities.  The estimated magnitude of 
the  size  effect is  virtually identical across the Tobit 
and Weibuli specifications and is  substantially larger in 
the log-logistic specification. 
Fuel prices appear to  have  some  positive impact on 
adoption probabilities, although the effect is statisti- 
cally distinguishable from  zero  only in the hazard models 
that use 1972 fuel  prices.  The point estimates for coop 
and government ownership suggest negative effects on 
adoption probabilities, but these are  imprecisely 
measured and cannot be  statistically distinguished from 
zero.  Finally,  the hazard nodeis suggest that  adoption 41 
probabilities initially rise  through time.  The magnitude 
of  the  time  coefficient in  the log-logistic specification 
implies that  the hazard diminishes within the sample 
period, suggesting that  the Weibull's restriction on  a 
monotonic hazard should be  rejected. 
To explore how much of  the size effect in these 
results might be due to  differences in adoption oppor- 
tunities, we next estimated a  model  of utilities' 
building decisions.  Table 4  reports estimates from 
probit models of  the building equations.41  The results 
indicate strong positive effects of  size  on building 
probabilities, although the quadratic terms indicate that 
the  size  effects peak sooner for  the building models than 
they  do for the adoption models (between 1600 and 6000 
Mw).  This implies that building probabilities decline 
with size over part of  the  sample of utilities.  Capacity 
growth rates  also have substantial positive effects on 
building probabilities.  Building probabilities rise 
through time,  but at  a  declining rate.  Finally,  coops 
and munis  appear to build less  frequently than do 
comparable investor-owned utilities, although the 
estimated effect is  fairly unstable and imprecise across 
specifications. 
41  The estimates assume serially uncorrelated 
independent errors.  If  these  assumptions are violated-- 
for example,  by negative serial correlation in  the 
errors-  -the  reported standard errors will be  inconsistent. 42 
These results suggest that  at  least  part of  the firm 
size  effect in  the  adoption  models may be due to  differ- 
ences  in  the  frequency of building, which translate into 
differences in  the  frequency  with which we  observe 
technology choices of  different types  of  firms.  To  treat 
this  possible source of  bias,  we  re-estimate the  adoption 
probabilities using the  full  information structure of the 
problem.  While  we  could in  principle apply this  tech- 
nique to all three  models, the  Tobit  and Weibull model 
impose restrictions on  the  time path of hazard rates  that 
more flexible models reject,  so we apply this  technique 
only to  the  log-logistic  hazard.  This  model  is  esti- 
mated on a  panel of annual data on each utility over  the 
1950  through 1980  period. 
Table 5  reports  adoption probabilities conditional 
on building for  a  number of specifications of  the  2400 
psi technology log-logistic  hazard.  A  comparison of 
table  5  with table  3  suggests quite substantive changes 
from the  simple adoption model  results.  First,  the 
estimated effect of  firm  size  on adoption probabilities 
is  halved.  While larger firms  appear to  exercise their 
opportunities to  adopt  the 2400  psi technology earlier 
than do  smaller firms,  about half the effect of firm size 
on  the  simple adoption probabilities can be attributed to 
differential building rates.  This suggests  that models 
that fail to  account for systematic differences in 43 
adoption or  observation opportunities may significantly 
overstate size effects on innovativeness.  The quadratic 
term suggests that size  effects peak in  the same  range as 
estimated in  table  3. 
Moreover, after  treating this  source of bias,  the 
effects of the other factors in  the adoption model become 
much more pronounced.  Average fuel  costs have a much 
larger estimated effect on decisions to  adopt  the new 
technology and can be easily bounded away from zero. 
The ownership variables also have a  significant effect in 
the full  maximum likelihood model.  Once differential 
building rates are accounted for,  government-owned and 
cooperative utilities are  less  likely to adopt the  2400 
psi technology than are investor-owned utilities.  At 
least  part of  this  effect may be  due  to  the  smaller 
effect of firm size.  Since munis  and coops tend  to  be 
smaller than are  investor-owned  utilities, firm  size may 
have absorbed part of  the  ownership effects in  the 
earlier results.  When the effect of firm size  is 
reduced,  the differences among the ownership structures 
becomes more apparent. 
Results for the  supercritical technology 
These same  statistical models can be used to  study 
the determinants of adoption probabilities for  the 
supercritical technology.  As  we  noted earlier,  the 44 
greater uncertainty surrounding this  technology is  likely 
to  have slowed its diffusion and the development of 
substantial reliability problems with early supercritical 
units appears to  have almost halted its diffusion by the 
end of the 1970s.  We are interested in exploring 
whether these  factors also  affected  which firms  are most 
likely to  have adopted the technology. 
Table  6  presents results from both simple adoption 
probability models and full  maximum likelihood models. 
In  columns 1  through 3,  we  report Tobit,  Weibull propor- 
tional hazards, and log-logistic hazard results,  using 
1970  capacity and 1972  fuel prices.  In general, these 
results are much noisier than were those  for the 2400 psi 
technology.  Utility size  has  a  slightly larger effect on 
adoption probabilities for  the supercritical technology, 
although the estimates are within a  standard deviation of 
those for the 2400 psi technology.  The quadratic in size 
continues to  be  important and adoption probabilities 
again peak in  the  8,500  to  10,000  Mw range.  Adoption 
probabilities rise  through time  (a > 1  in both Weibull 
and log-logistic  models), but eventually decline (in the 
log-logistic results).  The  time  paths  are  statistically 
indistinguishable from those for  the 2400 psi technology, 
but the point estimates suggest a  somewhat slower 
diffusion rate for supercritical units.  The fuel price 
and ownership variables have no  clear  effect in  these 45 
equations; the point estimates are unstable and the 
standard errors are enormous relative to the coeffi- 
cients 
We  report estimates for the  full  maximum likelihood 
model in columns 4  and 5  of  table  6.  Correcting for 
building opportunities  has much less  impact on the 
results for the  supercritical technology than it had for 
the  2400  psi technology.  The firm  size effect remains 
within 10  to  20  percent of  the  estimates from simple 
adoption probability models and are substantially larger 
than were the  corrected size effects for the 2400 psi 
technology.  The hazard rate rises  more quickly in  the 
full  maximum likelihood model,  though the difference in 
the coefficient from the simple log-logistic model does 
not appear statistically signficant.  The estimated 
effects of  fuel  prices and ownership structures continue 
to be unstable and very poorly identified. 
These results may be an artifact of the limited 
number of utilities that adopt this  technology over the 
sample period (39 of  144).  With only one-quarter of the 
sample ever adopting the technology, the data appear not 
to  contain enough information to  pin down distinctions 
among the  adopters and non-adopters.  Alternatively, the 
results may reflect the peculiarities of the supercriti- 
cal technology itself. 46 
6.  Conclusions 
The results presented in  this  paper provide strong 
evidence that large  firms  tend  to lead the electric 
utility industry in adopting technological innovations. 
For both of the new technologies  we  analyze,  large  firms 
were significantly more likely to be among the  early 
adopters.  There does,  however,  appear to  be  an optimum 
size  with respect to encouraging the diffusion of 
innovations:  for the very largest firms  in the industry, 
increasing size  reduces the probability of early adop- 
tion.  Our results also  suggest that  Oster's (1982) 
finding of  a negative correlation between firm size and 
innovativeness in  the  steel  industry does not generalize 
to all capital-intensive industries. 
Our results also  suggest that ownership structure 
can exert am important influence  on immovative activity. 
Investor-owned utilities tended to  adopt the 2400  psi 
technology earlier than did their municipally-owned and 
cooperatively-owned counterparts in  the  industry, leading 
to  more rapid  diffusion of  the technology through the 
industry.  This finding is  consistent with the  observa- 
tion that  investor-owned utilities also  exhibit more 
involvement in industry research and development activi- 
ties  and organizations. 
Finally,  our analysis provides strong evidence on 
the  need to  control for differences in  building 47 
opportunities when analyzing firms'  decisions to  adopt 
technologies embodied in long-lived capital.  Inmost 
cases,  we  expect to  observe more frequent capacity 
additions for  larger firms in  an industry.  This can lead 
econometric results to overstate the correlation between 
firm size  and adoption probabilities.  Je propose a 
methodology to  correct this  bias,  and find that  its 
application to  the 2400 psi technol  'r  reduces estimated 
size effects by one-half.  Moreover, we  find  that the 
effects of ownership structure and factor cost differen- 
tials  are larger and more precisely estimated after 
controlling for the opportunity bias.  These results 
suggest that  future studies of technology diffusion, and 
other studies that employ hazard rate analysis, may 
benefit from  application of  this  methodology. 48 
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38. Table 1 
SAMPLE  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
(144 Utilities) 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Utility Size (hundred MW) 
1960 capacity  9.91  14.75 
1970 capacity  19.26  27.54 
Utility Size2 (hundred  MW) 
1960 capacity  314.45  1153.19 
1970 capacity  1124.57  3505.59 
Capacity growth rate (%)  3.27  4.95 
Average fuel cost (cents/million  Btu) 
1962  26.51  6.03 
1972  39.48  11.81 
0mership  (0,1) 
Investor  .70 
Government  .17 
Cooperative  .13 
2400 psi technolozy 
First adoption  1953 
Percent utilities adopting by 1980  .65 
Mean adoption date (for adopters)  1967.9 
Suercritical technolov 
First adoption  1957 
Percent utilities adopting by 1980  .27 
Mean  adoption date (for adopters)  1968.1 Table 2 
NUMBER OF UNITS BUILT 
BY TECHNOLOGY CLASS AND TIME PERIOD 
Iiin  <  2000 psi  2000 psi  2400 psi  3500 si  Total 
1950-1954  115  11  2  0  128 
1955-1959  150  57  33  2  242 
1960-1964  71  41  61  7  180 
1965-1969  47  8  64  49  168 
1970-1974  50  13  62  70  195 
1975-1980  29  10  108  31  178 
Total  462  140  330  159  1091 Table  3 
ADOPTION PROBABILITY  ESTIMATES, NOT  CONDITIONED  ON  BUILDING: 
2400  PSI  TECHNOLOGY 
Aot-o Prohhflitv  Model 
Log-  Log- 
Variable  Tobit  Weibull  logistic  Tobit  Weibull  logistic 
Fuel price 
as of:  1972  1972  1972  1962  1962  1962 












Size  .070  .070  .118  .070  .068  .120 
(1970)  (.014)  (.008)  (.016)  (.014)  (.008)  (.015) 
Size2  -.00035  -.0004  -.0007  -.00035  -.0004  -.000] 
(1970)  (.00009)  (.00006)  (.00009)  (.00009)  (.00006)  (.00009) 












































Sigma  1.391  --  --  1.384  - -  - - 
(.172)  (.168) 
Log- 
likelihood  -235.52  -356.66  -350.92  -234.76  -358.05  -352.98 
Number  of 
Observations  144  144  144  144  144  144 
Standard errors  in parentheses. Table 4 
ESTIMATES  OF BUILDING PROBABILITIES: 
PROBIT  MODELS 
Variable  1970 Size  1960 Size  Time-Varying Size 
Constant  -2.375  -2.308  -2.235 
(.106)  (.105)  (.105) 
Size  .020  .024  .004 
(003)  (005)  (.004) 
Size2  - .0002  - .0004  - .0001 
(.00002)  (.00005)  (.00003) 
Growth  .112  .119  .136 
(.011)  (.010)  (.008) 
Tiie  .119  .121  .123 
(.013)  (.012)  (.013) 
Tinie2  - .003  - .003  - .003 
(.0004)  (.0004)  (.0004) 
Coop 
- .101  - .153  - .291 
(.093)  (.093)  (.091) 
Government  .015  - .044  - .183 
(.077)  (.076)  (.075) 
Sap1e proportion 
no build  .804  .804  .804 
Proportion  Correctly 
Predicted  .830  .831  .831 
Log-likelihood  -1778.97  -1787.22  -1791.67 
Number of Obs.  4464  4464  4464 
Standard errors  in parentheses Table  5 
ADOPTION  PROBABILITY  ESTIMATES,  CONDITIONAL  ON BUILDING: 
2400 PSI TECHNOLOGY 
Variable  1972 fuel price  1962 fuel price 
Constant  -15.615  -13.296 
(1.157)  (1.055) 
Size  .051  .051 
(1970)  (.009)  (.008) 
Size2  - .0002  - .0002 
(1970)  (.00006)  (.00005) 
Fuel Price  .061  044 
(.009)  (.016) 
Coop  -1.246  -1.424 
(.401)  (.423) 
Government  -1.056  -1.092 
(.326)  (.331) 
Time  4.386  4.013 
(.305)  (.275) 
Log-likelihood  -2557.87  -2578.71 
Number of Observations  4464  4464 
Standard  errors  in parentheses. Table 6 
ADOPTION PROBABILITY  ESTIMATES: 
SUPERCRITICAL TECHNOLOGY 
Not Conditioned on Building  Conditioned  on Building 
Log 
- 
Variable  Tobjt  Wejbull  lo&istic  Fuel  72  Fuel 62 
Constant  -3.479  -11.315  -15.196  -16.766  -15.389 
(1.625)  (2.282)  (2.392)  (1.448)  (1.429) 
Size  .122  .085  .100  .090  .092 
(1970)  (.046)  (.014)  1.020  (.010)  (.011) 
Size2 
- .0006  -  0005  .0005  - .0005  - .0005 
(1970)  (.00025)  (.0001)  (.001)  (.00007)  (.00007) 
Fuel Price  .007  - .009  .005  .004  - .038 
(1972)  (.028)  (.016)  (.021)  (.011)  (.021) 
Coop  .230  .044  .222  - .603  - .661 
(.960)  (.798)  (.849)  (.657)  (.647) 
Government  .128  .104  .073  .257  .311 
(1.019)  (.741)  (.838)  (.463)  (.453) 
Time  --  2.675  3.639  4.468  4.366 
(.629)  (.642)  (.407)  (.415) 
Sigma  2.344 
(.615) 
Log-likelihood  -90.76  -183.39  -178.94  -2496.24  -2494.09 
Number of Obs.  144  144  144  4464  4464 
Standard errors in parentheses. Figure  1 
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